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INTRODUCTION 
The question of the nature and meaning of history has 
become increasingly important in contemporary thought. In 
theological circles, it has become the central theme of dis-
cussion. There are a number of reasons why this is so. The 
events of the times in which we live have brought about a 
definite rejection of any knowledge-equals-progress idea of 
history as well as a call for interpretation of the profound 
social crises which we confront. The widespread influence of 
existentialism, with its emphasis on relativism and subject-
ivism, has brought into question not only the nature of his-
tory, in terms of present reality, but alsothe validity of 
the historians• pursuits. 
For the Christian theologian, the development of higher 
criticism of the Scriptures has brought the question more to 
the fore. Literary and historical criticism led the scholars 
of fifty years ago either to an emphasis on the ethical teach-
ings of Jesus or to a search for the historical Jesus. More 
recently, form criticism, particularly in the hands of 
Rudolf Bultmann, has resulted in a shadowing of the occurrences 
of the past and an emphasis on the events of faith. Inasmuch 
as Christianity has traditionally claimed to be an historical 
religion grounded in such events as the Incarnation, the Cru-
cifixion and the Resurrection, all of which happened in time 
but which also involve the dimension of the eternal, the 
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que s t i on of history looms as a cri t ica l one. Such ideas a s 
the Kingdom of God, redemption , l i fe after death, and the 
purposef ul Will of God carry within them much concerning the 
nat ure and meaning of history, but even more important than 
these is the fact of the historical basis of the Christian 
faith. 
As a result of this increased interest, a multitude of 
books and articles have been written in the last twenty-five 
years, and particularly during the last ten , on the subject 
of history and, since the question still rema i ns an open 
one, more can be expected. Chr i s tian historians such as 
Herbert Butterfield, Arnold Toynbee, and Karl LBwith have 
brought real insight to the question and have attempted to 
see some patterns of meaning in history from the perspective 
of faith. Others have been led to the question of history 
by more indirect paths, but have had tremendous influence on 
the discussion. Such is the case with the two men whose 
thought will be our primary consideration; Rudolf Bultmann 
and Reinhold Niebuhr. Ne ither is an historian, as such, but 
both have muph to say about history. 
Born in 1884 and educated in Germany, Rudolf Bultmann 
served on the faculties of several universities before accept-
ing a professorship at the University of Marsburg in 1921. 
There he remained until 1951 when he became professor emeritus. 
It is as a New Testament scholar that Rudolf Bultmann reaches 
the question of history. 
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Like Schleiermacher, Bultmann has seen his task to be 
that of addressing the modern man and making the Christian 
Gospel intelligent and relevant to the mind and to the needs 
of such a man. His perspective is from a philosophical under-
standing of man that reflects considerable dependence on 
Heidegger, the existentialist, but his primary concern is 
man's relationship to God. In this light, he attempts to 
use the best tooks of modern science and philosophical thought, 
as well as his expert skills as a Biblical scholar and critic. 
In 1941, he delivered a lecture which was later published 
under the title "the New Testament and Mythology." Brief 
though this lecture is, it brought about tremendous contro-
versy from various Protestant theological positions. Because 
of his emphasis on the eschatological nature of the Christ-
event and bis insistence that the Christ of faith be pro-
claimed with little or not concern for the historical Jesus 
or his moral teachings, theological liberalism, particularly 
the Life Qf. Jesus School which preceded him, reacted by labeling 
him a radical, as did those who stood within the School of 
the History of Religions. On the otherhand, conservatives, 
some who rejected all Biblical critical study and others who 
accepted it within limits, were aghast at Bultmann's claim 
that the New Testament was filled with myths and must there-
fore be demythologized in order to be intelligible to modern 
man. The debates which followed were many. During the early 
portions of these "vigorous conversations," discussion of his 
idea of demythologizing was central, but it was not long be-
fore most scholars realized that the question of the nature 
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and meaning of history lay at the base of all of their dis-
cussions. It is primarily in this area that the Bultmann 
debates have continued. 
Unlike Bultmann, Reinhold Niebuhr arrives at the 
question of history from the paths of a parish minister and 
a professor of Christian ethics. Born in Wright City, Miss-
ouri in 1892, the son of a German Evangelical minister, 
Niebuhr attended college and seminary in the Mid-West and 
received his Bachelor of Divinity and Master of Arts degrees 
from Yale. Upon graduating, he became minister in a newly-
organize d parish in Detroit at the time when that Michigan 
city was rapidly becoming the automobile capital of the world 
and one of the chief industrial centers of the nation. It 
was during his thirteen-year ministry in this parish that he 
became vividly aware of the irrelevancy of the moralistic 
idealism which his liberal theology made tantamount to the 
Christian faith. The crises of personal lives and the social 
ills of an expanding technical society, not to mention t he 
tragic events of World War I, crowded up around him, forcing 
him to a rejection of the unrealistic optimism of liberalism 
and to deep and searching questions about the nature of the 
Gospel and its meaning for the everyday lives of people. 
In 1928, he became professor of Christian Ethics at 
Union Theological Seminary. It was here that he began to 
clarify this thoughts and formulate his ideas concerning the 
relationship of the Christian Gospel to the life of men in 
their personal and social lives. This led him quickly to 
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the basic question of the nature and meaning of history. As 
early as 1932, he dealt specifically with the Christian inter-
pretation of history in a book entitled ~ezond Tragedy, but 
it was in his published Gifford lectures of 1941 and 1942, 
~ Nature and Destiny .QA. ~' that the subject received full 
treatment. An elaboration of these ideas was published in 
1949 under the title Faith~ History. 
Niebuhr, like Bultmann and perhaps all theologians, 
has his share of critics , but it must be admitted that his 
works have brought about.fir less controversy than have 
Bultmann's . Those of the liberal persuasion, both secular 
and Christian, have been among his most vocal critics, at-
tacking him mainly at three points: (1) what they consider 
his preoccupation with the negative aspects of man's nature, 
t hat is man's basic sinfulness; (2) his denial of any idea 
of the perfectability of man and therefore of the inevitable 
progress of history; and {3) his criticism of liberal culture 
from an admittedly Christian perspective (obviously, "scien-
tific" inquiry can never go to empirical evidence holding 
presuppositions, particularly religious onesl) . From other 
critics of the Barthian persuasion came words of concern 
about his relationship of faith to reason . Niebuhr has res-
ponded to some of these criticisms in later writings, parti-
cularly !!Ut ~ ~ the Dramas .Q.f History, published in 1955. 
Beginning from the point of Christian ethics and giving 
considerable attention to the nature of man, Niebuhr develops 
his concept of history quite differ ently from Bultmann. I t 
will be the task of this paper to examine the idea of history 
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in the thought of each of these men and then , thr ough a cri-
tique and comparison , evaluate each in terms of their 
strengths and weaknesses as well as their similarities and 
differences. 
CHAPTER ~ 
RUDOLF BULTMANN: CONCEPT OF HISTORY 
The meani n g of history lies always in the present, 
and when the present is conceived as the eschatol-
ogical present by Christian faith the meaning of 
history is realized. Man who complains: 11 1 cannot 
see meaning in history, and t herefore my l ife, 
interwoven in history, is meaningless," is to be 
admonished: do not look around yourself into 
universal history, you must look into your o~m 
personal history. Always in your present lies 
the meaning in history, and you cannot see it 
as a spectator, but only in your responsible 
decisions. In every moment slumbers the possi-
bility of being the eschatological moment. You 
must awaken it.1 
With the above s tatement, Rudolf Bultmann concluded 
his Gifford Lectures in 1955 on the subject "History and Escha-
tology. 11 Until these lectures, this German theologian had 
said very little about the subject of history directly, though 
implicitly he had said a great deal. As we have noted earlier, 
his writings stem from his work as a New Testament scholar and 
deal primarily with that aspect of form-criticism known as 
demythologizing. At the core of all of his writings, however, 
lies his understanding of the nature and meaning of history. 
Indeed, it has been to these concepts, that many of his 
critics have aimed their heaviest blows. The result has been 
one of the most active theological struggles of this century. 
1Rudolf Bultmann, Histo:y and Eschatology (Edinburgh: 
The University Press, 1957), p. 155. 
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Bultmann ' s concept of history and its meaning is inti-
mately tied up with t he presuppositions which he makes fo r 
historical study. This is true to the extent that aay dis-
cussion of one includes the other and thus our presentation 
will, in effect , jump from one t o t he other, though making 
some attempt to list his presuppositions. 
Let us begin , however, w~th one statement regarding 
his understanding of history. "His tory is understood as the 
history of mind. But mind is not realized otherwis e than in 
human thoughts, and human t houghts are ultimately intentions 
of individuals. The subject of history is therefore humanity 
within the i ndividual human persons; therefore it may be said: 
the subject of history is man." 2 We will return to this later 
for further discussion, but, keeping this i n mind, let us now 
consider some presuppositions which Bultmann makes for his-
torical study. 
First, it is presupposed that the historian will not 
approach his task for the purpose of supporting conclusions 
which he has already drawn. Such prejudice will not allow 
his research to speak freely to him, and in fact, will render 
his work of questionable value even before he begins. 
Secondly, it is presupposed that the historical method 
of research will be employed and will make use of all avail-
abl e scientific data in approaching the material. In studying 
written works, for example, the rules of grammar, the meaning 
of words, the individual style, the language of the time, as 
2I b1d., p. 143. 
-
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well as the historical setting, must be given appropriate 
attention and understanding. This is no less true with 
Biblical exegesis than with other literature. 
A third presupposition is that "history is a unity in 
the sense of a closed continuum of effects in which individual 
events are connected by the succession of cause and effect. 11 3 
This does not mean that the process of history does not in-
clude free decisions of men whose actions affect historical 
happenings, but it does mean that even these decisions are 
not without causes and motives. It is the historian's task 
to come to know the causes and the motives of actions and 
events and thus to understand the whole historical movement 
as a closed unity. An implication which is obvious in such 
a presupposition is that there can be no intervening super-
natural powers, no effects without causes, no miracles for 
which there are no causes which lie within history. As a 
science, historical research cannot perceive of such an 
occurrence and, should it find. one, must discount the act or 
event as without historical reality. 
It is also presupposed that within the continuum, 
historical phenomena are many-sided and complex. The French 
Revolution, for example, may be viewed in economic or polit-
ical terms, in religious or social terms, etc. Historians 
will vary in their assessment of these forces and will, in 
fact, be guided by some particular point of view. His inter-
pretation may be from an aesthetic interest, a psychological 
3Rudolf Bultmann, 11 Is Exegesis Without Presuppositions 
Possible?'', Encounter, vol. 21, no. 2, Spring, 1960, p. 196. 
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interest, a political interest, or what-have-you, but he will 
mandatorily have some specific way of raising questions and 
interpreting data. This implies that the historian must have 
certain understandings of his particular interest in the matter 
being studied. That is, to approach a certain matter from 
the aesthetic interest requires, for example, that the his-
torian must have knowledge of art, its technique and essence, 
etc. Or if the interest is psychological, the historical 
scholar must have knowledge of psychical phenomena. Bultmann 
calls this 11 pre-understanding 11 and sees it as an unavoidable 
and necessary presupposition to historical study. 
A fifth presupposition grows out of this to say that 
the historian must stand in a life relatiam to the subject 
matter. Specifically, this means that only he who lives in 
a state and in a society can comprehend the social and polit-
ical phenomena both of the past and the present. And only he 
who has a life-relation to music can understand research mate-
rial that deals with music. Generally, it may also be seen 
to mean that only he who recognizes himself as standing 
within history and taking part in it can adequately approach 
historical research. This "existential encounter" with his-
tory causes the historian to participate excitedly in history 
and in his study and thus to be able to hear the claims of 
history. 
Because this is so, a sixth presupposition arises to 
require that there always be an open-endedness to historical 
study that recognizes the importance ct' continued and contin-
ual historical research. With the claim which historical 
ll 
phenomena make both upon the "now" and upon the historian 
the study must never be closed, but reviewed, evaluated and 
renewed in every generation. 
The question that immediately aTises from all of these 
presuppositions is whether objectivity ln the knowledge and 
interpretation of historical phenomena is a.t all attainable. 
Indeed, historical research can establish as fixed and objec-
tive certain items within the historical process: dates, 
locality, etc.; those occurrences which happened in a certain 
place and at a certain time. But history cannot be seen as 
limited to such chronologically and geographically deter-
minable events and actions. History is really concerned with 
the interpretation, the meaning and the significance of events 
and actions and these cannot be established objectively in the 
sense of absolute ultimate knowledge nor in the sense of 
purity. Because of the historian's viewpoint, because of his 
existential encounter with history, because the historical 
phenomena speak to the historian in the present, the subjec-
tivity of the historian is involved. In terms of his view-
point and pre-understanding, it is j'.l.st the recognition of 
this that gives his research objectivity. Only if he makes 
his viewpoint absolute, is his research subjective. In terms 
of his life relation, however, 
• • • the demand that the interpreter must silence 
his subjectivity and extinguish his individuality, 
in order to attain to an objective knowledge is, 
therefore, the most absurd one that can be 
imagined. • • • The most subjective interpretation 
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is in this case the •most objective,' that is, 
only those who are stirred by the question of 
their own existence can hear the claim which 
history makes.4 
In his introduction to Jesus and the Word, Bultmann 
deals with this matter of subjectivity by pointing out that 
man cannot observe history in the same way in which he ob-
serves nature because of his essential involvement. Thus, 
every time man says something about history, he is saying 
something about himself. He can encounter history only as 
he enters into dialogue with it and he can hear its demands 
only as he comes seeking answers to the questions of his own 
existence. This does not end in complete relativism if the 
observer is willing to place even the subjectivity of his 
position under his interrogation of history and is willing 
to listen to history as an authority. This is the point at 
which there may be found an objective element which is really 
present in history.5 
Returning to our earlier reference to Bultmann's 
understanding of history as man, we can now go further in 
discussing what is the meaning of history. The core and 
subject of history is man and the concern of history is, 
therefore, the field of human actions. It is Bultmann's 
contention that human actions are caused l2iL their purposes 
and their intentions and that, therefore, human life is 
4Rudolf Bultmann, Essays (New York: The MacMillan 
Company, 1955), pp. 255-56. 
5Rudolf Bultmann, Jesus and the Word (New York: 
Cl'm'les Scribner's Sons, 1934), PP· 3-15. 
smu:a a J&a&i 
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always future directed. Man is always "on the way" and each 
moment contains within it not only the past but also the 
future. 
All that man does and undertakes in his present 
becomes revealed only in the future as important 
or vain, as fulfillment or failure.6 · 
Every present situation grows out of the past and yet, because 
it is also a situation of decision which concerns the future, 
it contains both the past and the future. 
The relativity of each present moment, rightly 
seen by historicism, is therefore not relativity 
in the sense in which any particular point within 
a causal series is a relative one, but has the 
positive sense that the present is the moment of 
decision, and by the decision taken the yield of 
the past is gathered in and the meaning of the 
future is chosen.7 
This leads Bultmann to the second of his ma.ior conclusions 
regarding the meaning of history (the first being that his-
tory is the history of man) and that is that the relativity 
of every historical situation is understood as having a posi-
tive meaning. 
Christianity and History 
Because Bultmann's concept of history is so entwined 
with his understanding of the meaning of the Christian faith, 
we turn now to a discussion of Christianity and history. 
Throughout all of his writings in this area, there are many 
implications concerning his concept of history though they 
are rather difficult to determine at points, particularly in 
any organized way. 
6Bultmann, History and Eschatology, p. 140. 
7Ibid., p. 141. 
UL&Zt a a Wkdi& LWWWil&Wd 
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Perhaps the best place to begin is with Bultmann's 
distinction of myth, historisch (objective-historical), and 
geschichtlich (existential-historical). Bultmann sees these 
three elements as evident in the New Testament and in the 
early Church. 
The term "myth" has been used with great frequency in 
recent theological conversations, often with variant meaning. 
According to Bultmann's formal definition, myth is a way of 
expressing "the other worldly in terms of this world and the 
divinein terms of human life, the other side in terms of this 
side.118 By the way in which he employs the terms, however, 
he appears to broaden the definition to include the expression 
of a world-view which is untenable to modern man. Perhaps the 
two may be seen as one in the light of what he sees the pur-
pose of myth to be: "The real purpose of myth is not to pre-
sent an objective picture of the world as it is, but to ex-
press man's understanding of himself in the world in which 
he lives. 11 9 To this end, then, while it may appear that man 
is describing his world, he actually is describing his own 
existence. Any primitive cosmology which proclaims the exis-
tence of demons, for example, would not so much describe the 
objective world as it would man's realization that his life 
has limitations which are beyond his control. 
It is Bultmann's position that in the New Testament the 
Christian Gospel is couched in a first-century world-view and 
8Rudolf Bultmann, et al, Kerygma ~ Myth: A Theolo-
gical Debate (Londnn: SPCK, 1953), footnote 2, p. 10. (The 
ensuing analysis of Bultmann's treatment of myth is based. pri-
marily on this essay.) 
9rbid., p. lo. 
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in the mythology of Jewish apocalyptic and the Gnostic myths 
of redemption. To get at the core of the Gospel, which is for 
all time and all people, and make it intelligible to modern 
man. the New Testament must be demythologized and the kerygma 
laid bare. Veiled in all of its mythological finery, it is 
not apt to lead man to decide for God. 
In laying his foundations for demythologizing the New 
Testament, Bultmann cites a number of aspects of this mytho-
logical framework which are totally unacceptable to ·modern 
man. Obviously, the Babylonian cosmology of a three-story 
universe which places a flat earth in the center with heaven 
upstairs and hell in the basement is a world view which is 
impossible for any modern man seriously to hold. Belief in 
spirits, whether good or bad, as well as belief in miracles 
are contradictory to what we now know about the forces and 
laws of nature and natural causation as well as to man's 
understanding of himself as a rational being and as essentially 
a unity. Any mythological eschatology that includes the par-
ousia of Christ in literal terms, as the New Testament expects, 
is further unacceptable. That death is the punishment of sin 
or that a doctrine of atonement that makes one sinless man's 
death an expiation of another's guilt could be taken very 
seriously by contemporary thought is sheer nonsense. The 
resurrection of Jesus Christ falls under the same objection 
as do the virgin birth, the healing miracles, the ascension 
of Christ, and His pre-existence. The kerygma must be stripped 
of its mythological framework and re-interpreted into a mean-
ingful message for today. 
• ®'ZMKWWMiWNii &# & W*iiHWih ii 
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It should be made clear that in approaching mythology 
in the New Testament, Bultmann is not following the Liberal 
formula. Liberalism examined the myth by modern knowledge, 
measured it as meaningless, and threw it out of Christianity. 
Bultmann, however, sees his task as one of interpreting myth 
from the understanding of human existence which the New Testa-
ment enshrines. In other words, the task is to interpret 
myth existentially so as to arriTe at the New Testament solu-
tions to the riddle of human life, solutions which, as truth, 
are acceptable to the non-mythological mind of today. 
Bultmann has been heavily criticized at this point of 
demythologizing, not so much because of its value in form 
criticism, which is recognized, but because of the danger 
involved in the selectivity of what is to be regarded as myth 
and in the importance attributed to myth. Such phrases as 
"Lamb of God" are obviously figurative ones, but others can-
not be so easily distinguished. We shall say more about this 
later. 
The second element which nust be recognized is histor-
1sch or the objective-historical. 11 H1storisch means an event, 
a fact, which took place on a certain date, which can be 
verified in our ordinary experience with the aid of the his-
torical method. 1110 The narrative elements of the New Testa-
ment center in the definite historic person of Jesus of 
Nazareth and therefore lend themselves to study as objective 
10 L. Malevez, T~ Christian Message and Myth (London: 
SOM l?ress, Ltd., 1958T, p. 73. 
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happenings by the historian. Such events a.re those which have 
a definite place in world history. The passion of Jesus pro-
vides a good example: his betrayal, arrest, trial and cruci-
fixion are determinable by objective scientific study. They 
are not mythical and, apart from interpretation, may be 
readily accepted as historical events, in the sense of !!1&-
torisch. The question which arises, of course, is whether 
these objective-historical events are the concern of theology. 
Faith in the cross has an entirely different meaning from a 
belief in the cross as a fact of history. To Bultmann, the 
prime concern must be with the content of faith and not mere 
historical data. 
The third element which Bultmann distinguishes is 
termed geschichtlich or the existential-historical, and is of 
the greatest importance. ~phichtlich, like historisch, is 
concerned with an event but it is one Which cannot necessarily 
be connected with a date or a place, nor proved by historical 
evidence. It is an existential encounter that bespeaks of 
the I-thou dimension of life: an element which makes an 
event significant for my existence and possibility and of the 
greatest relevance for my life today. This is particularly 
evident in the way in which the Cross is understood. As we 
have noted, the Cross may be viewed as histor~ which admits 
the fact of the crucifixion of Jesus. But in the Christian 
message, the significance of the Cross is lifted to cosmic 
dimensions as a ges£g1-£htlich event which affects the whole 
of huinanity in its relation to God and through which each man 
may find his real self. Indeed, the existential-historical 
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(gesctlchtlich} fact originated in the objective-historical 
(hist2£i~ch» event of the crucifixion of Jesus, but the ac-
knowledgement of such a death in 30 A.D. and the confession 
that this same long-ago death has all-important significance 
for me today are two different things. The significance of 
the Cross as geschichtlich transcends the temporal and speaks 
to men both then and now. The distinction of these two terms 
is a tremendously important one. Obviously, Bultmann attri-
butes the greater value to the existential-historical (~­
.[Qhichtlich). 
With these three elements in mind, Bultmann goes about 
his task of making the Gospel relevant to the contemporary 
mind, but he does so against an existential understanding of 
faith and eschatology. 
If the being of man in the true sense of the term 
is to be understood as historical being, which 
draws the reality of its experience from encounters, 
it is clear on the one hand that faith which speaks 
of the act of God which encounters it cannot de-
fend itself against the objection that it is no 
more than an illusion - for the encounter with God 
is certainly not objective in the sense of being 
an event of the natural order; but on the other 
hand it is equally clear that faith, being a reality 
of encounter on the level of existence, not only 
is not under any necessity of refuting this objection, 
but cannot in fact attempt to do so1yithout mis-
understanding its own significance. 
It is only in faith that one can say that in this or 
that. event God acted or that God spoke to me. In this faith 
and in the decisions of faith, it is God himself who encounters 
man and in the encounter Christ is transformed into "God for us." 
11Giovanni Miegge, Gospel and Myth!!!.~ Thoua~t 2f 
Rudolf Bultmann (Richmond: John Knox Press, 1960T, p. 200. 
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Bultmann's treatment of falth involves the existen-
tialist view of man and identifies the life of faith as au-
thentic being. 
The New Testament addresses man as one who is 
through and through a self-assertive rebel who 
knows from bitter experience that the life he 
actually lives is not his authentic life, and that 
he is totally incapable of achieving that life by 
his mm efforts. • • • Authentic life becomes 
possible only when man is delivered from himself. 
• • • At this very point where man can do nothing, 
God steps in and acts - \~deed he has acted al-
ready - on man's behalf. 
By the grace of God man's sins are forgiven, he is released 
from the bondage of the past and he is made free for the 
future. This is self-understanding speaking to self-under-
standing. The response of faith is a receiving of self-hood 
as a gift and a deliverance into freedom. His past is always 
present in the state of being forgiven, but his future is open 
to obey the Will of God. 
The event of Jesus Christ is the revelation of the love 
of God which makes man free from himself and free to be him-
self. The fact that the faith which transforms takes place 
in necessary association with a figure "who for us cannot be 
more than an ideal picture drawn by his followers, or a 
theological symbol, does not in the least evacuate the divine 
encounter of its reality. 1113 The historian may answer some 
questions about Jesus of Nazareth, but faith, being personal 
decision, cannot be dependent upon a historian's labor. 
12Bultmann, et al, Ker~gI\la ~Myth: ~ Theologic~~ 
Debate, pp. 30-31. 
13M1egge, .Qll• ~., P• 89. 
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This leads us to the area of eschatology for the de-
cision of faith is, to Bultmann, an eschatological event. In 
his Gifford lectures, Bultmann defined eschatology as "the 
doctrine of 'last things' or, more accurately, of the occur-
rences with which our known world comes to an end. 11 14 He 
makes it clear,. however, in a response to J. Schniewind, 
that the only true interpretation of eschatology, rather than 
be one which lies beyond the bounds of time and space, must 
be a real experience of human life. 15 The primary message of 
Jesus was an eschatological one - that of the coming of the 
reign of God - but it must be understood in unity with his 
ethical teachings. As such, Bultmann contends, the fulfill-
ment of God's will is the condition for participation in the 
salvation of God's reign and that requires man's decision 
for God now, in the concrete moment as he confronts his 
neighbor. As he so responds in faith, man participates in 
the eschatological. Eschatology involves this moment of en-
counter, crisis and decision, a passage from anxiety to faith, 
from inauthentic to authentic being. 
The real historicity of the Ohristian life be-
vomes apparent from the fact that his life is a 
continuous being on the w;?' between the 'no 
Longer• and the 'not yet. 
The man in faith is no longer who he was for he is in a world 
not of the flesh and this is the eschatological. The paradox 
14Bultmann, History and Eschatology, p. 23. 
15Bul tmann, et al, Kerm~ !Ylll M;zth • • • , P• 106. 
16Bultmann, Historl and E~cha~ologz, p. 46. 
-
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is that he is, at the same time, not yet. He must still become 
what he already is and yet he already is what he shall become. 
It was in this "time-between" that the early Christians found 
themselves in light of their belief in the impending coming 
of the end of the world. But it is also the situation of the 
contemporary Christian whose faith is built upon the geschi~h­
tlich which, in essence, is eschatological. 
As we have progressed, some idea of the way in which 
Bultmann employs these concepts has been obvious. It will be 
well, however, to go back and spell this out a little more 
clearly. We may begin by observing that Bultmann approaches 
his task of demythologizing the New Testament with a heavy 
hand and a well-sharpened pencil. Because of his concern to 
get at the basic kerygma, he eliminates most of the events of 
the Synoptic Gospels as being highly mythical and therefore 
unreliable. Of greater importance, however, is his claim 
that even if the records of the historical Jesus were more 
historically accurate and extensive, they would still be of 
little value since, as historisch, they could not lead to an 
encounter with the Christ of faith. The objective-historical 
has only theoretical interest for historical research. Other-
wise, it is of little importance. 
We have already noted that the event of the Cross is 
seen to be an objective-historical (historisch) event, but 
more importantly, an existential-historical (geschichtlich) 
fact. Even here, however, demythologizing must be done to 
remove the untenable views of sacrifice. and blood atonement 
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as well as those of a pre-existent Son to whom death would be 
meaningless. The Cross is thus the existential-historical 
event through which God spoke and still speaks his word of 
forgiveness. It was not an event of objective reconciliation. 
All that can be said is that through it God was able to pro-
nounce his word of pardon and that whenever it is preached 
anew it encounters man with God's love. 
The resurrection, on the other hand, must be immediately 
declared as myth, on the grounds of Bultmann's presuppositions 
and his analysis of modern man. 
Nothing preceding the faith which acknowledges 
the risen Christ can give insight into the 
reality of Christ's resurrection. The resurrection 
cannot • • • be demonstrated or made plausible as 
an objectively ascertainable fact on the basis of 
which one could believe. But insofar as it or the 
risen Christ is presented in the proclaiming word, 17 it can be believed - and only so can it be believed. 
After considering the historical evidence, then, Bultmann 
throws out the resurrection as myth, and establishes its 
reality as existing in the proclamation of the Word. Because 
He is present in a way different from the presence of any 
other historical person, His presence - His resurrection -
is an eschatological event. Because, however, the resurrec-
tion must be connected to ~ objective-historical event, 
Bultmann attaches it to the event of the Cross and sees them 
as a unity. To believe in the resurrection is to believe in 
the saving efficacy of the Cross of Christ. Together, they 
17Rudolf Bultmann, Theol~gt .Q.f. ~ lifil!. Testament 
(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1951), Vol. I, p. 305. 
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are proclaimed. "Christ meets us in the preaching as one 
crucified and risen. He meets us in the word of preaching and 
nowhere else. The faith of Easter is just this - faith in the 
18 
word of preaching." 
Bultmann gives similar treatment to other aspects of 
his Biblical study including interpretation of the Old Testa-
ment. In his essay on ":Prophecy and Fulfillment," he gives 
particular attention to the covenant concept, the concept of 
the Kingdom of God, and the concept of the people of God and 
he interprets them in their eschatological dimension.19 
Realizing that the New Testament was written in light of the 
Easter faith, he sees the understanding of Jesus as Lord and 
Saviour and as the decisive eschatological event, as one 
which gradually developed in the early Ohurch. The whole 
concept of vicarious sacrifice developed in the Church, as 
did the concept of Jesus as Messiah and as Judge, and the con-
cepts of the resurrection and the Incarnation. Bultmann, in 
fact, presents an evolutionary outline of the development of 
a Ohristology and does so against the background of the early 
Church which became both Jewish and Greek and which had to 
adjust to its existence as both an historical phenomenon as 
well as an eschatological event. That development may be 
sketched, as it finds New Testament expression, as follows: 
( 1 ) The germ-cell is the kerygma of the death 
and resurrection of Jesus 
18Bultmann, et al, !f_erygpia and. }'I;x:th ••• , p. 41. 
19Bultmann, Essays, PP• 191-206. 
(2) 
( 3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(?) 
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The brief kerygma of the passion and Easter 
required fuller visualization, • • • and 
assignment of a place in the divine plan of 
salvation; ••• {thus) the account of the 
Baptist and the proofs of fulfilled pre-
dict ions. 
The Christian 11 sacraments 11 had to be accounted 
for in the life of Jesus. 
A visualization of what Jesus had done • • • 
Hence the collection of miracle-stories. 
Probably the apophthegms also stood in the 
service of this visualization. 
The reason that sayings of the Lord ••• came 
more and more to be taken up into 11 the gospel" 
is that, while missionary preaching continued, 
preaching to Christian congregations took on 
ever increasing importance. 
Finally both the moral exhortation and the 
regulations of the Congregation had to be 
accounted for 1n the life and words of Jesus. 
Hence, ••• /the~/ were also taken up into 
"the gospel. u'2'0 
This growth from the simple to the complex is seen by 
Bultmann to be based not on objective-historical data but on 
what the Church came ,t.Q. believe about Jesus. In doing so, 
the germ-cell of the Gospel was clouded while at the saem 
time being made more relevant to the needs of the early 
Church. 
It is Bultmann's point that the Gospel be seen in its 
core to be the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ. To do 
so requires demythologizing, but.also recognizing that faith 
rests not on h..1storisch but on geschichtlich. The kerygma 
comes to contemporary man as an act of God demanding complete 
surrender and at the same time offering authentic being. 
This is an act of divine revelation and Christ lives again in 
its proclamation. It 1s this miracle or revelation and its 
response, whether in faith or in re,jection, that makes it an 
20Bultmann, 1heology of the New Testament, Vol. I, 
p. 86. 
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eschatological event. 
We began our discussion of Bultmann's concept of his-
tory with a quotation from his Gifford lectures. In the light 
of all that has been said, it may be well to repeat it now: 
The meaning of history lies always in the present, 
and when the present is conceived as the escha-
tological present by Christian faith the meaning 
of history is realized. Man who complains: 'I 
cannot see meaning in history, and therefore my 
life, interwoven in history, is meaningless,' is to 
be admonished: do not look around yourself into 
universal history, you must look into your own 
personal history. Always in your present lies 
the meaning in history, and you cannot see it as 
a spectator, but only in your responsible decisions. 
In every moment slumbers the possibility of being 
the eschatological moment. You must awaken it.2T 
We understand Bultmann to be saying, primarily, three 
things. First, no one can expect to see any meaning in what 
might be called universal history, that is, some general 
pattern or purpose into which observable events may be fitted. 
God's purposes are known and worlced out by Him, but they are 
indiscernible to man. Christians believe that His purposes 
.ar~. being worked out, but how the goals are being achieved 
is known to Him alone. 
Secondly, the meaning of history lies within each man's 
own existence in the present moment. As man, called by Christ 
to authentic being, stands in the eternal present, forgiven 
of his sins and open to the will of God in his future, the 
esohatological moment becomes real. In the responsible deci-
sions of that moment can the meaning of history be realized. 
26 
Thirdly, history must be seen to stand in an exis-
tential .relationship with man. That is to say, man cannot 
be viewed as the subject and history as the object, or even 
the reverse. Man is in history from his origin and within 
it has his existence. History must be approached from the 
inside and not from the outside. Difficult as these thought 
patterns may be, Bultmann seems to be grounding his under-
standing of history in the nature of human existence. As 
such, man is called to be himself in authentic being and 
the essential nature and meaning of history must be inter-
preted in these terms. 
CHAPTER II 
REINHOLD NIEBUHR: CONCEPT OF HISTORY 
As minister of a Detroit church and as professor of 
Christian ethics at Union Theological Seminary, Reinhold 
Niebuhr has somehow found the time to write a great many books 
and a tremendous number of articles for both secular and reli-
gious periodicals. His motivations for such writings are 
twofold. To preach the Gospel in such a way that it will be 
credible to modern man is, of course, primary. His major 
books are written particularly toward this end. The second 
motive deals with the application of the principles of Chris-
tianity to every day living. In his early publication en-
titled Leaves !f.2!!! ~Notebook of~ Tamed Cynic, he observed 
that "the average man always accepts the gospel 'in principle,' 
l 
and then proceeds to emasculate it by a thousand reservations." 
Often the application is either ignored or presented with lack 
of clarity. Convinced that the Gospel must be brought to 
bear upon contemporary issues, regardless of how controversial 
they might be, Niebuhr has written innumerable articles on a 
variety of social and political issues and, in several of his 
books, has critically analyzed the American scene from the 
Christian perspective. There can be little doubt that he is 
the outstanding American theologian of our day, regardless 
1Reinhold Niebuhr, Leaves from the Notebook of a Tamed 
Cynic (New York: Willett, Clark,-ancf Colby, i929),-,P.-l~-
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of the fact that he claims, with humility, not even to be 
a theologian. 
Throughout all of his writings has run a persistent 
interest in the nature and meanillg of history. Because of 
his insistence that man must see meaning in his life, this 
would obviously be so. The precise structure of his concept 
of history, however, is not quite so obvious. Our approach 
will be to attempt to get at the bases of his thought and to 
understand his primary emphases. 
In order to comprehend Niebuhr, one must first recognize 
the fact that he is a believer, to the first degree, in the 
reality of polarities in life which are incapable of synthesis. 
These are sometimes seen to be utter contradictions, but must 
be nonetheless held as true. Immanence and transcendance, 
freedom and necessity, time and eternity, disclosure and ful-
fillment, and the like are polari.ties which stand in tension 
to one another, contradicting, overlapping, intersecting. 
Robert E. Fitch claims to have listed well over one hundred 
such polarities as found in Niebuhr's books. 2 Throughout his 
writings appear such sentences as "insofar as . . . ' this is 
true, but insofar as ••• , it is not true. 11 All of this 
malces for a rather complicated understanding of history, and 
an even greater amount of confusion when trying to systematize 
his thoughts. 
2Robert E. Fitch, "Reinhold Niebuhr's Philosophy of 
History," Reinhold Niebuhr: His Religious, Social and Polit-
~ Thought, ed. by Charres r.'Keg!ey anO: Robert 1·1:-.E'retall 
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1961), p. 300. 
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overcome all evil and result in the fulfillment of human life. 
Like the classical view, history is e~uated with the nature-
time process, but unlike it, history derives its meaning via 
the gradual triumph of human reason. 
In order to understand fUlly why these two views of 
history are so repugnant to Niebuhr, it will be well for us 
to return to the subject of polarities and consider some to 
which he gives special attention; freedom and necessity, man 
within the temporal process yet transcending it, memory and 
destiny, and disclosure and fulfillment. 
Man is in nature. He is, for that reason, not of 
nature. It is important to emphasize both parts. 
Man is the creature of necessity and the child of 
freedom. His life is determine~ by natural contin-
gencies; yet his character develops by rising 
above nature's necessities and accidents. With 
reference to the purposes of his life, it is 
significant that the necessities of nature are 
accidents and contingencies. Sometimes he is 
able to bend nature's necessities to his own 
will; sometimes he must submit his destiny to 
them.5 
Man, as a creature, is subject to the vicissitudes of nature, 
influenced by its demands, driven b7 its impulses. He is a 
body and must therefore eat, drink, and sleep. And as a mortal 
he must die. He is limited by here~ity and by the environment 
in which he finds himself. At every stage of his development, 
man, in the individual sense as well as in the larger communal 
sense, remains a creature of nature, bound by its necessities. 
But man is more than this. He is free to manipulate 
the processes of nature, to impose his own will upon its forces. 
5Reinhold Neibuhr, Beyond fragedy (New York: Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1937), pp. 292-29,. 
I• 
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The fact that he can think about his limitations, consider 
his physical necessities, removes him from the purely animal 
level and is an aspect of his freedom. He can seek to com-
prehend the temporal process, discern the seauence, causal-
1 ties and recurrences of the natural world. He is free to 
make decisions in relation to the natural world and to other 
men. Because he is free to choose, one can never be certain 
about what will follow any given moment. He is free to 
choose the unforeseen. For this reason, man cannot be 
studied exclusively as one studies the world of nature. But 
he is also free in a deeper sense. "Man is a spirit who 
stands outside of nature, life, himself, his reason and the 
world. 116 In this respect, man is capable of transcending the 
flux of the natural world and of considering the whole 
meaning of human history. This is the radical freedom which 
allows man to understand the meaning of the warfare of good 
and evil in life and to possess a surveillance of reason it-
self. Man is therefore both creature and creator. H.e is 
involved in the flux of the natural world and is limited by 
its necessities. But he also transcends nature and time and 
thus may create new levels of coherence and meaning as well 
as contemplate his own finiteness. 
Niebuhr's concept of history is built on this two-
sided predicament of freedom and necessity and of man's involve-
ment in the temporal process yet his capacity to transcend it. 
6Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destin~ £! M.fil.E. 
(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1949), One Vol. edition, 
I, P • 3. 
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He is never freed completely from natural necessity, but he 
is also never limited completely to it. This is the realm of 
history. 
Man's ability to transcend the flux of nature 
gives him the capacity to make history. Human 
history is rooted in the natural process but it 
is something more than either the determined 
sequences of natural causation or the capricious 
variations and occurrences of the natural world. 
It is compounded of natural necessity and human 
freedom. Man's freedom to transcend the natural 
flux gives him the possibility of grasping a 
span of time in his consciousness and thereby 
knowing history. It also enables him to change, 
reorder and transmute the causal sequences of 
nature and thereby make history. The very ambi-
guity of the word "history" (as something that 
occurs and as something that is remembered and 
recorded) reveals the common source of both 
human actions and human knowledge in human free-
dom.? 
There are four consequences which obviously follow from 
this approach and they are an integral part of Niebuhr's under-
standing of history. The first is the fact that man's freedom 
is the source of his dignity and his creativity, but it is 
also the source of his peril. A finite and a physical creature 
yet gifted with the capacity to survey eternity, he is able 
to look at himself as one creature among many, but he is 
also able to look at the world with his mind being the fo-
cusing center of the whole. Thus is he ever tempted, in his 
freedom, to make himself the center of all. In pride, he 
refuses to see his limitations. Man is mortal, but he pre-
tends not to be and that is his sin. This is possible only 
because man is free. In an excellent sermon on the Tower of 
7Ibid., II, p. 1. 
.. 
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Babel, Niebuhr shows this to be the case even when speaking 
of man in his communal life. 8 Inevitably, human cultures and 
civilizations build towers through which they pretend to be 
higher than their real height and claim a finality which is 
not theirs to possess. This two-dimensional existence of 
freedom and necessity, of nature and spirit, places man in 
tension and provides the possibility for nobility, but also 
for sin. A concomitant of this is the fact that the possi-
bility for sin is always with man and, because he can never 
escape his limitations regardless of his striving, he is 
aware that he can never achieve perfection. It is important 
to note that this is not a defect in the creation of man, but 
rather a defect which is possible because man has been endowed 
with freedom. 
A second consequence is closely related to the above 
and grows out of the fact that the meaning of history, by 
reason of the freedom and transcendance of the human spirit, 
is never contained within or satisfied by the natural-histor-
ical process and thus must point beyond itself. Man, in 
search of .fulfillment, but faced with the knowledge of his 
limitations and of the imperfections within natural history, 
cannot believe that the meaning of history can be found in 
such incompleteness. 
Insofar as he transcends the temporal process, 
he can discern many meanings in life and history 
by tracing various coherences, sequences, cau-
sali t1es and recurrences through which the 
events of history are ordered. Eut insofar as 
man is himself in the temporal process which he 
seeks to comprehend, every sequence and realm 
of coherence points to a more final source of 
meaning than man is able to comprehend rationally.9 
Insofar as he is involved in history, the dis-
closure of life's meaning must come to him in 
history. In so far as he transcends history 
the source of life's meaning must transcend 
history.lo 
Thus we are confronted with another polarity in the 
thought of Niebuhr: disclosure and fulfillment. Akin to 
this is the polarity of mystery and meaning. Within the 
curious mixture of freedom and necessity, lies the realm of 
history. Its meaning is partially intelligible, but not 
completely, partially disclosed but not fully. Filled with 
obscurities, incoherences and unfulfilled meanings, history 
points beyond itself. We will deal vith this more completely 
when we come to the discussion of the relationship of Ohris-
tiani ty and history. 
The third and fourth consequences have great bearing 
on the way in which one approaches the study of history. 
The third has to do with the relationship of the past to the 
present. If one is to comprehend man, he must come to know 
his history. In a very real sense man is a being in history 
who has a history, but it is also true that history is in 
man. Instead, therefore, of relegating history to something 
9Niebuhr, Faith~ Histor~, p. 49. 
10Niebuhr, The Nature ~Destiny of ~' II, p. 36. 
(Two interesting sermons on this subject appeared under the 
titles "City Which Hath Foundation" and "Mystery and Meaning" 
in his book Discerning~ Signs .Q.f.~ Time~.) 
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remote and forgotten, it must be seen as a dimension of the 
present. The past dwells within the present in two ways: 
(1) through our memory of events, and (2) through the imme-
diacy of the situations which the past places at our door-
steps. These might be viewed as the polarity of memory and 
destiny. Niebuhr sees memory as "the fulcrum of freedom for 
man in history" inasmuch as by memory man is able to grasp 
the uniqueness of historical events without reducing them to 
natural necessities.11 Memory understands that events do not 
necessarily follow from previous events, but sees the mixture 
of freedom and necessity which gives uniqueness to every his-
torical event. By memory, man is able to rise above the 
temporal flux and interpret present realities through the 
uniqueness of past events. This he does not by logic but 
by memory which is one of the facets of his freedom. 
The past is present not only in our memory of its 
events, but also in the present realities which we confront 
resulting from those events. Niebuhr cites, as an example, 
the memory of an accident, but also the scar on the fore-
head. More seriously, he points not only to the memory of 
the slaves which our fathers brought from Africa but also 
the reality of the problems existing on the contemporary 
scene. We cannot, by human freedom, revoke the social con-
figurations which have developed from decisions of the past. 
Facts of locale of birth, economic status of parents, polit-
ical and cultural traditions, laws and institutions present 
11 Niebuhr, Faith and History, p. 19. 
.. 
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themselves with irrevocable force upon the present. Some 
are facts of nature while others are facts of history which 
combined freedom and necessity. All of them, however, are 
part of the present and, in their complexity, they represent 
a confusion of freedom and destiny. 
The fourth and final consequence which grows out of 
Niebuhr's approach to history through his understanding of 
freedom and necessity is the need to distinguish sharply be-
tween history and nature. As we have observed, events in his-
tory cannot be understood as having been dictated by natural 
necessity. Because of his unique freedom, man is able to 
create 11 curious and unexpected and unpredictable emergences 
and emergencies in history."12 Confronted with a multitude 
of possibilities, he is able to be a creator of historical 
events which do not yield themselves to examination by the 
natural sciences?Dr to bases for accurate predictions of the 
fUture. History is such a compound of freedom and necessity 
that historical events are complexly interwoven into and 
superimposed upon each other. "The complex of events which 
constitutes history is thus such a bewildering confusion of 
freedom and destiny, that the historical cannot be made to 
conform to the patterns of either logical or natural coherence. 1113 
Furthermore, it must be observed that man's freedom over 
time results in historical structures and patterns, institutions 
12Reinhold Niebuhr, The Structure of Nations and Em-
nires, (New York: Charles S'C'ribner's SonS";" 1959), p-;-:f.~ 
13Gordon Harland, The Thought of Reinhold Niebuhr 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 92. -
... 
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and cultures, which transcend the life span of the organisms 
of nature. Oom:i;a.red to the slow mutations of the forms of 
nature, novelties of human creativity may erupt with such a 
tempo and in such dimensions that historical change may be 
seen to be radically different. 
Historical patterns are in a category of reality 
which cannot be identified with the structure 
o.f nature. They are to be sharply distinguished 
from natural structures because they represent a 
compound o.f freedom and necessity.14 
To the degree that men are not .free, their actions may be 
scientifically charted. But to the degree that they are free, 
the events in history are so varie~ and complex that their 
meaning may not be easily comprehended. Scientific general-
izations are seen as impossible. History can therefore never 
be equated with nature. 
It follows, too, that knowledge of history cannot be 
approached in the same way as knowledge of nature. At this 
point Niebuhr frankly admits that he is confronted with the 
problem of relativism of historical knowledge and that from 
it there is no rational escape. This is historical relativism 
on two fronts: (1) relativism resulting .from the complexity 
of historical causation, and (2) relativism resulting from 
the ambiguous position of the observer. Niebuhr deals with 
this subject extensively in his book The Self and the Dramas 
-----,-···-
~f .!ll.§..~or~. and emphatically points out the impossibility of 
subjecting history, with its complexity of causation, to the 
precise analyses of scientists and philosophers, who, to his 
--"""'-r. .... _... ___ ... __ .,.., ......... ~~· ......... ---------------------
14Reinhold Niebuhr, The Self and the Dramas of Historz 
(New York: Charles Scribner's SOllS, ... 195517 p. 45. 
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chagrin, consistently try to understand historical dramas 
in terms of natural or ontological necessity. The events 
of history involve the motives of the agents of action, their 
resentments, their ambitions and jealousies, in addition to 
the concentration of multiple social and historical forces. 
The historian will do well to approach his task with consid-
erable phrQ~esis (practical wisdom), The position of the 
observer of the historical scene is moreover such that he 
cannot claim objectivity for the "observers of this drama 
are invariably themselves involved in the historical flux 
which they are trying to survey. 1115 Historical distance from 
the event is likewise of little value in resolving the problem 
of historical relativism for the viewer remains within the 
temporal flux and. must therefore observe the events from his 
particular locus and perspective. 
There are, of course, valid social and historical 
sciences. They are le.gi timate when the scientists 
know themselves to be historians, rather than 
natural scientists; and therefore recognize that 
their generalizations are hazardous and specula-
tive.15 
There is no solution to the problem of historical relativism, 
but careful and honest historical inquiry by historians who 
report from their various perspectives rather than from 
scientists who claim empirical observation and scientific 
observation, can yield valid historical knowledge. Extreme 
biases, of course, will be refUted and obvious propagandists 
15Ibid., p. 53. 
16Ibid., p. 45. 
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ignored. The reports and interpretations of the events of 
history by honest historians will provide the only solution 
to the problem, but even then the knowledge cannot have the 
exactness of knowledge in the field of natural science. 
Inasmuch as knowledge of history is always interpreta-
tion of history, unless, of course, one resorts to the 
listing of objective data without evaluation of any kind, and 
such is of little value, the meaning of history and of human 
life comes into consideration. Either question presupposes 
an ultimate framework of .meaning and such a framework is 
derived not from an investigation of history itself, but 
from religious faith. 
History in its totality and unity is given a meaning 
by some kind of religious fatth in the sense that 
the conceut of meaning is derived from ultimate 
presuppositions about the character of time and 
eternity, which are not fruits of detalied anal-
yses of historical events.17 
It is within this faith that history may be seen either to 
have meaning or to remain meaningless. If, as we have noted, 
history does indeed point beyond ltself, and history is ful-
filled in some point beyond time, and the polarity of mystery 
and meaning may be comprehended, then faith must supply the 
framework. It is at this point that we therefore must con-
sider Niebuhr's understanding of Christianity and. history. 
Ohristianiti ~ Histori 
The Christian faith begins with, and is founded 
upon, the affirmation that the life, death, and 
17 Niebuhr, Faith~ History, p. 118. 
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resurrection of Christ represent an event in 
history, in and through which a disclosure of 
the whole meaning of history occurs.18 
The demand for religious faith as a framework of meaning is 
met by Niebuhr with the insistence that the whole historical 
drama becomes meaningful by being oriented from the Christian 
perspective. As he has noted, specific presuppositions are 
mandatory for any interpretation of the meaning of history. 
He readily admits that his interpretation rests squarely on 
Christian presuppositions. 
The focal point of Niebuhr's interpretation of history 
is the revelatory event of Christ and, though it is a scandal 
to find the meaning of history in anhi.storical event, it is 
nonetheless the only source of understanding history. The 
truth of the revelation can be apprehended only by faith, 
but, given the revelation, reason can show that it gives the 
only adequate understanding of the character of history and 
the meaning of human life. 
In considering the significance of the revelatory event 
of Christ, we will want to consider Niebuhr's understanding of 
such things as the Incarnation, the Cross, and the Resurrec-
tion. It will be well, however, if we first give attention 
to his treatment of symbol and myth. At times, it seems that 
Niebuhr uses these terms interchangeably, but actually he 
does make a slight distinction. A symbol is a partial and 
particular aspect of life which is used to illuminate the 
meaning of the whole, to point to the eternal. Symbols are 
18 6 Ibid., p. 2 • 
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the tools of myths in that they are used to give meaning beyond 
the limits of their immediate and obvious meaning. They become 
instruments of linking the realms of time and eternity. Thus, 
almost any idea or event may have symbolic significance in its 
ability to communicate a larger truth. The myth, on the other 
hand, is a story, whose origin may or may not be known, Which 
serves to communicate profound religious truth. The term here 
does not mean mere fairy tale or fable, but rather means an 
attempt to give depth to history as an artist does to a paint-
ing. In Beyond Tragedy, myth and symbol are discussed in the 
opening sermon and are seen to be both deceptive and true.19 
They are deceptive insofar as their elements may draw such 
attention to themselves that they obscure or even hide their 
deeper meanings: they are true inasmuch as they are the pur-
veyors of truth about the ultimate meaning of life. As de-
ceivers, they have frequently been misunderstood. Some have 
treated myths with attention only to the facts and events of 
the natural order while others have viewed them as scientific 
absurdities and therefore of no value. Biblical mythology has 
fallen prey to both errors with literalism being the result 
of the first and rationalistic dismissal the result of the 
second. It is Niebuhr's point that the1 must be taken seri-
ously, though not literally. He is keenly aware of the fact 
that as conveyors of eternal truths in time they are the 
only means of speaking of the trans-historical. "Meaning can 
19 Niebuhr, Beyond Tragedx, pp. 3-24. 
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be attributed to history only by a mythology. 1120 Biblical 
symbols and myths are therefore an attempt to point to ulti-
mate meaning from the position of finiteness: they reveal 
true insights about God-man relationships. 
Niebuhr is quite clear in his treatment of the creation 
story and of the fall, but there is considerable ambiguity in 
his treatment of the Incarnation, the Cross and the Resurrec-
tion. It is the affirmation of the New Testament that Christ 
is the end of history as well as a new beginning. In His 
life, death, and resurrection, the meaning of man's existence 
is .fulfilled in that God is seen to have a resource of mercy 
and love and forgiveness which completes history. In Christ, 
there is a new beginning in that man, seeing the true mean-
ing of life and responding with faith and repentance, may 
experience renewal of life. This is the wisdom of faith, 
however, and may not be reduced to rational comprehension. 
In Christian thought Christ is both the perfect 
man, 'the Second Adam' who had restored the per-
fection of what man was and ought to be; and the 
Son of God, who transcends all possible human 
life.21 
By this Niebuhr means that Christ is the revelation of the 
very impossible possibility which the Sermon on the Mount 
elaborates in ethical terms, that is the absolute law of 
love. "The Jesus of history is a perfect symbol of the abso-
lute in history because the perfect love to which pure spirit 
20Reinhold Niebuhr, Reflections on the End of an Era 
(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1934):--J;'. 123:- ~ ~ 
21N1ebuhr, Beyond Tragedy, p. 16. 
43 
aspires is realized in the drama of his life and cross.1122 
Seen With reference to the cross, Christ is the norm of human 
existence which is derived from the ultimate relation of the 
divine to history, a relation of love. By His freedom God 
"1 nvolves Himself in the guilt and suffering of free men who 
have, in their freedom, come in conflict with the structural 
character of reality. 1123 The orthodox statement of the two-
fold nature of Christ is deceptive in many ways and yet it is 
true in that it expresses the paradoxical relationship to 
divine ~gane which comes down to man to conquer and human 
gga~~ Which rises above history to a sacrificial act. The 
tragedy of the cross was necessary simply because it was the 
f'Ullest expression of God's love and forgivenese. The Cross 
stands as a judgment upon all men who, in their search .for 
meaning, seek to make themselves the center o.f the whole. 
But it also stands as 11the assurance that judgment is not 
the .final word of God. 1124 The mercy 0£ God does not wipe out 
the distinctions of good and evil in history but rather over-
comes what man cannot overcome by himself. Thus, the 11.fe 
and Cross of Ohrist reveal the true nature of God and unleash 
for man new power and meaning in his life. 
The Resurrection of Obrist, while it cannot be ascer-
tained as an historical fact as can the Cross, cannot be dis-
missed as irrelevant. 
-------~--~-·"··---~-----------------
22Niebuhr, Refle9tions • • • ' P• 287. 
23Niebuhr, ~ Nature and Destinz of ~, II, p. 71. 
24 4 1.!?1-J!., I, p. 1 2. 
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The church as a fellowship of believers was 
obviously founded upon the conviction of the 
fact of the resurrection. This 'fact' con-
tained an alternation in the story through 
faith's apprehension of the significance of 
the story. To recognize that the Oross was 
something more than a noble tragedy and its 
victim something else than a good man who died 
for his ideals; to behold rather that this suf-
fering was indicative of God's triumph over 
evil through a love which did not stop at in-
volvement in the evil over which it triumphed; 
to see, in other words, the whole mystery of 
God's mercy disclosed is to know that the 
crucified Lord had triumphed over death ••• 
It is the revelatory depth of the fact which 
is the primary concern of faith.25 
The Resurrection is both the triumph of Christ over sin and 
the proof of God's power to overcome death. It is important 
to note that, to Niebuhr, the miracle of the recognition of 
the true Christ in the Resurrection was an event of immediacy 
and not one which is grounded in a slow-dawning consciousness 
of the church. The Resurrection is a miracle without which 
the church could not have come into existence. The Crucifix-
ion and the Resurrection are ~ events through which man is 
able to find meaning in history. They are God's word of 
revelation to man that discloses His sovereignt~ over history 
as well as His justice and mercy and that discloses the mys-
tery of His relation to history. 
From these Christian presuppositions there are many 
implications which Niebuhr draws. Five of them deserve at 
least our brief attention. 
(1) Christianity deals with the whole of history and 
not just a particular people. It views by faith certain 
25 Niebuhr, Jqith and Histo!,Y, pp. 147-148. 
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events in history and proclaims that these events have rele-
vance for all men in that they transcend the whole panorama 
of time and reveal the source and meaning and end of all his-
tory. God covenants with men from any nation who are called, 
that is, "who are able to apprehend by faith that this person, 
drama and event of history discloses the power and the love 
which is the source and the end of the whole historical drama.n26 
(2) Faith in the sovereignty and love of God gives 
unity to history. but it is always faith. The significance 
of the events of the life, death, and resurrection of Christ 
come to man by revelation and not by sight or reason. This 
is not to say that reason is of no value in man's relationship 
with God nor that Christianity is completely irrational, but 
it is to say that man must face and acknowledge his limitations. 
The revelation of God cannot be proved: it can be accepted 
only by faith. Examples abound in the history of Christianity 
of attempts to "prove" what is revealed. Even Biblical stories 
such as the virgin birth are little more than efforts to give 
credibility to the revelation of the significance of Christ. 
To do so is to make faith less than it must be. 
(3) The Cross of Christ reveals the true distinction 
between evil and good. Instead of negating the evil of man, 
it reminds him of the reality of evil. Man sees the true 
norm of human existence and is vividly aware that he falls 
short. But he sees even more than this: he sees that his 
freedom, which is the source of his dignity and creativity, 
26 Ibid., p .. 27. 
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is also the source of his sin. Sin is placing one•s self in 
the role of God, in the center of the whole, as the being 
around which all of history moves. In his freedom, man re-
fuses to recognize his limitations and claims for himself 
that which rightfully belongs to God. Viewing the Cross, 
it is impossible to calm his guilt any longer by pointing to 
natural necessities. In the Cross, the distinction of good 
and evil is preserved and affirmed and God's judgment upon 
sin is made all the more severe. 
(4) In Christ, man sees the norm of human existence 
and accepts the law of love as the ethical ideal. Such an 
ethic is an impossible possibility. This results in two 
things: (1) ethical relativism, and (2) the realization 
that the absolute is never attainable. Ethical relativism 
is not, in this sense, that held by some who say that "moral 
principles are only relative to particular culture and sit-
uations.1127 Instead it is a relativism based on the fact that 
love is the source of ethical decisions and actions and not 
some objective moral law. Because, however, the life-ethic 
can never be perfectly applied in the realm of history, man 
is caught in a contradiction. Niebuhr has been emphatic in 
his belief that there are no simple choices in the problems 
which man and society face. The situation of man is that he 
must choose the lesser of two or more evils rather than an 
undiluted good. The law of love remains, nonetheless, the 
ideal and its relevancy is three-fold. It serves as a 
27Reinhold Niebuhr, "Christianity and Moral Law," 
The Christian Century, Vol. LXX, No. 48, Dec. 2, 1953, P• 1386. 
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measure of our failure, providing a basis for an evaluation 
of our achievements and it serves as an absolute standard 
toward which we move. Finally, the ideal of love serves as 
a principle of discriminating and making decisions. 
Where there are two or more alternatives, both 
admittedly falling short of the ideal. the law 
of love provides the criterion by which we may 
determine which of these 'second-bests' apnrox-
imates most closely to the idea1.28 · 
(5) In an earlier section, we noted that Niebuhr con-
tends that history, filled with obscurities, incoherences and 
unfulfilled meanings, points beyond itself and that the end 
of history is not a point in history, but beyond it. In the 
light of the Christian faith, this takes on a new dimension 
of meaning. 
Everything in human life and history moves 
toward the end. By reason of man's subjec-
tion to nature and finiteness this 'end' is 
a point where that which exists ceases to be. 
It is finis. By reason of man's rational 
freedom the 'end' has another meaning. It is 
the purpose and goal of his life and work. 
It is telos.29 
The Christian faith fully understands the tension between these 
two and, though it cannot solve the problem, it looks toward 
the end of history with faith and hope rather than with fear. 
Finis is the end of time, but telos, the Christian faith in-
sists, lies outside of history. The Christian faith makes a 
further claim and that is that in the revelation of God in 
Christ the end of history as telos has already come with a 
28G.H.O. MacGregor, !.rut Relevance of ~ Impossible 
Ideal, (New York: The Fellowship of Reconciliation, n.d.), p. ~ 
29Niebuhr, ~Nat~~~ Destin~ of~' II, p. 287. 
48 
disclosure of the meaning of history though not a full reali-
zation of that meaning. It is one of the supreme paradoxes 
of Christianity that telos has preceded finis. Such a faith 
means that the world has been overcome and that the incoher-
ences and incompletions of history have been in a sense 
illuminated. But such a faith also points to the end when 
all of the corruptions and incompletions of history shall be 
completely overcome. 
In the New Testament the eschata or last things are 
described. in three fundamental symbols: the Parousia, the 
Last Judgment, and the Resurrection. Niebuhr sees the Second 
Coming of Christ as dominant over the other two symbols inas-
much as the latter are actually expressions of Christ's return 
as triumphant judge and redeemer. The Second Coming of Christ 
is symbolically significant because (1) it demonstrates the 
fact that since Christ is the norm of all human existence, 
existence cannot defy that norm: (2) it expresses the Chris-
tian hope of fulfillment of life while holding fast the 
essential conception of the relation of time and eternity, 
placing fulfillment at the end of history and not in some far 
off abstraction: (3) it demonstrates the ultimate triumph 
of the law of love: and (4) it witnesses to the sufficiency 
of God's sovereignty over all the world and history. 
The symbol of the Last Judgment in New Testament 
mythology enshrines three basic ideas in the Christian under-
standing of life and history. (1) Christ Himself will be the 
Judge and He will judge men not by their finiteness but by 
their sin as seen by their own ideal possibility which has 
-,,. 
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been known in history. (2) The distinction between good and 
evil will be affirmed instead of swallowed up in some nebu-
lous eternity. Granted that historical realities are ambig-
uous. making absolute distinctions within history impossible. 
the final judgment allows this necessity and possibility. 
(3) Coming at the "end11 of history, the Last Judgment sym-
bolically demonstrates a denial of any possibility that his-
tory can fulfill or complete itself. Any idea that by 
growth and progress man can emancipate himself from his 
guilt and sin is fully refuted. Fulfillment can come only 
at the end and from God, though it is related to the whole 
process of history. 
The third symbol which the New Testament employs to 
describe the eschata is that of the resurrection. The idea 
of the resurrection of the body is a hope which implies the 
redemption of the whole man. Eternity will fulfill the rich 
variety of the temporal process and yet will in some way main-
tain the freedom of man. The body symbolizes man's relation 
to nature and the contribution which nature makes to indi-
viduals and to all historical realizations. The resurrection 
of the body further implies that the whole unity of history 
belongs to eternity and that all of its particularities 
shall be brought into the harmony of the whole. The resur-
rection of the body thus has individual and social signifi-
cance and the end of history is viewed as loving fellowship 
with God. 
All three of the symbols have great meaning for the 
Christian understanding of history. Though they may not be 
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taken literally, it is important that they be taken 
seriously. 
At the conclusion of his book, The Self and ~ ... D-.r..,.am-.a-.s-. 
of History:, Niebuhr makes the folloWi.ng statement. 
The dramas of history contain many facts and 
sequences which must be rationally correlated. 
But the frame of meaning in which these facts 
and sequences are discerned must be apprehended 
by faith because it touches the realm of mystery 
beyond rational comprehension. The ultimate 
question always remains whether the mystery ia 
so absolute as to annul the meaning of the his-
torical drama or a 'light that shineth in dark-
ness,' which clarifies, rather than annuls, all 
the strange and varie .. gated dramas of human 
history.50 
Our discussion of Niebuhr's concept of history points 
clearly to his belief that Christ is the key to the meaning 
of history. Within this framework, we understand him to be 
primarily saying the following things. 
History deals with man in his wholeness and therefore 
must be sharply distinguished from nature. 
Freedom and necessity are dialectical realities and 
man's freedom is the source of his creativity as well as of 
his evil. Because this is true, history itself can never be 
viewed as redemptive. Christ only can serve as judge and 
redeemer. 
History has both unity and meaning, but this can be 
acknowledged only through faith in God and not through 
empirical evidence. 
History is a complexity of incoherences, fragments, 
and incompleteness and points beyond itself for meaning and 
30Niebuhr, ~ ~ ~ ~ Dramas 2! History, p. 242. 
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fulfillment. Man, even though he responds in faith and 
repentance to Christ and acknowledges God as the center of 
the whole, must accept h1s limitations ano. the trutn tnat 
only 1n tne end of history will he find fUlfillment. 
CRAFTER III 
COMPARISON AND CRITIQUE 
Rather than approach this aspect of our task by crit-
icizing each of the men and then comparing them, or doing the 
reverse by comparing them first and then criticizing sepa-
rately, it seems feasible to combine these two and move 
through their thought comparing and criticizing at the same 
time. At certain points, Niebuhr and Bultmann lend them-
selves to the same criticisms. Even ideas which differ may 
sometimes be criticized for the same reasons. There are, of 
course, areas of their thought which must be treated sepa-
rately and this we will do. 
For the purposes of organization, we will follow the 
outline used earlier by considering first their general views 
and then their views of Christianity and history. 
Bultmann has attempted to defend his position with re-
gard to the subjectivity of the historical scholar as being, 
in effect, his objectivity, but the concept still presents 
problems. It !.!!. true that the presuppositions of historical 
research, particularly in terms of pre-understanding and in 
terms of the investigator standing within history, necessarily 
result in subjectivity, but it does not follow that the re-
searcher, recognizing these facts, is therefore objective. 
Indeed, if the historian must make use of secondary sources 
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or the observations of other historians then he necessarily 
is giving subjective interpretation to subjective interpre-
tation of objective events. Obviously, this could go on 
~ absurdum. Perhaps we must say that historical study can 
never be objective and would be meaningless if it could. A 
certain objectivity may be achieved toward one's own presup-
positions, but this will surely prevent one from believing 
that objectivity in history can ever be attained. Recognizing 
history as remembered and interpreted event, the existentialist 
would isolate himself in his own decisions. At the same time, 
it must be said that the historian of integrity surely goes 
to his material with sincere intent to record objective fact 
as best he can. This is what distinguishes it from legend 
and fiction. If Bultmann carries this too far, he is, as a 
New Testament scholar, destroying his own tools. 
Niebuhr has insisted on the relativity of historical 
knowledge in the light of the manifold causations of historical 
events and in the light of the ambiguous position of the ob-
server. While he does not do this in existentialist terIDin-
ology, he is in agreement with Bultmann regarding the impos-
sibility of objective recording of history that goes beyond 
the recording of mere data. He does not, however, say that 
a recognition of this subjectivity provides the historical 
scholar with objectivity. Actually, Niebuhr's concern is 
much more that the interpreter of history be an historian 
instead of a natural scientist or a philosopher and that 
such an historian recognize fUlly his limitations and the 
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hazards of his generalizations and interpretations. Niebuhr's 
view of the problem of historical relativism seems to be much 
more healthy than Bultmann's. 
Another area of comparison is at the point of the anal-
ysis of the present. Both men see history as living in the 
present and both acknowledge the existence of the past and 
the future within that present. But while Bultmann places 
his real emphasis on history as being future-directed, Niebuhr 
deals primarily with history as past-directed. It is as if 
one were saying that history is pulled forward while the other 
were saying that history is pushed forward. There are several 
observations that might well be made. 
While the future of man influences his decisions in 
every moment in terms of intention, it is also true that 
much that actually transpires is not what he had intended. 
Many of the leaders of the Protestant Reformation or the 
French Revolution threw up their hands in horror when they 
saw the things which actually took place, declaring that they 
had never intended to produce anything like that. The very 
moving play ~ Bloody Tenet is an excellent dramatization 
of this very fact as Roger Williams is transported to the con-
temporary American scene to witness the long-range results of 
his plea for religious freedom. This is all simply to say 
that the idea of future-directed man must be seen within 
limitations. 
In contrast to Bultmann, NiebUhr places his emphasis 
on history as paBt-direoted. It is interesting to note that 
even though his understanding of freedom acknowledges the 
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wide possibilities of decision in any given moment, he does 
not put much stress on the influence of these possibilities 
within the present where the decision is made. It must be 
acknowledged that he does recognize that the intentions of man 
do have their effect, but there is not, in his thought, much 
sense of man being "pulled," so to speak, by his future. 
One wonders why, as a dialectician, he does not hold these 
two aspects of man's present in greater balance. 
At this point in our discussion, it appears wise to 
consider points in each of these men's writings which cannot 
be compared, but which must be criticized. We are thinking 
specifically of Bultmann's analysis of modern scientific 
thought and of Niebuhr's treatment ~f the condition of man. 
One of the weakest points in Bultmann's concept of 
history lies in his understanding of modern scientific 
thought. When he discusses history in his Gifford lectures, 
he makes it quite plain that he sees history as movement of 
process founded on the connection of single events in a chain 
of oause and effect, a continuity which allows no room for 
intervention from an outside source which might be thought 
of as supernatural. This is likewise made clear as he ap-
proaches demythologizing for he presupposes that modern man, 
influenced by the natural sciences, is an independent unity 
that cannot possibly accept a redemptive event brought about 
by transoendant intervention, nor any phenomena tba.t stand 
as exceptions to the natural laws of creation. Bultmann 
leaves himself open for criticism at at least two points. 
To begin with, it is a bit questionable whether any 
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theologian should set himself up as capable of speaking in 
the name of contemporary scientific thought. The fact of the 
matter is, as Malevez has correctly observed, 
If there is something of which we can be quite 
certain, for us all, it is this, that in the 
form which it has assumed during recent decades, 
science has given up the attempt to make a pic-
ture of the world at all, because it knows that 
such a picture cannot possibly be created.l 
Secondly, even if one does not go to the opposite extreme 
and accept the Principle of Uncertainty, the concept of 
scientific determinism has been brought into serious question. 
Not only has science no authority to establish the principle 
of determinism in physical reality as necessary, there seems 
to be considerable evidence that, indeed, events .2.Q. occur 
which have no cause, phenomena which really are new. Whether 
this is proved true or merely held as a possibility, Bultmann 
cannot use the principle of determinism as a basic part of 
modern thought. A further problem regarding Bultmann's 
treatment of the causal sequence is the transoendanoe of 
man and the place of his intention. One must ask whether 
these intentions stand within or without the sequence. If 
they stand outside of the sequence, then is there an outside 
reality which may affect something within the sequence? And 
is his eschatologioal being, which is so much a part of his 
personal decisions, affected by the causal sequence? If man's 
intentions and decisions are involved in the cause-effect 
sequence, then where is the order of nature and history to 
claim the sequence unbreakable? 
lMalevez, .2.12.• cit., p. 127. 
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Even if one ignores all of these arguments from the 
point of physics, there is reason to believe that modern man 
has no problem accepting the possibility of divine interven-
tion. The attention given by many devout and intelligent 
Christians to the whole subject of miraculous healings would 
lead one to conclude that such an idea is not untenable. 
Bultmann's thought hangs heavily on this aspect of his anal-
ysis of modern man. If it is false or even questionable then 
his whole theory of history is in trouble, but particularly 
at this point of ignoring or demythologizing anything which 
smacks of the supernatural or miraculous. 
Turning to Niebuhr's analysis of man, we are con-
fronted with two problems, ma.n's evil and man's transcendance. 
With reference to the first, this aspect of his thought is 
probably the most well known. That man's sin stems basically 
from his freedom, and that it expresses itself in pride and 
in sensuality are important truths to be recognized. The 
point in question is whether Niebuhr emphasizes man's sin 
to the extent that he should be left in nothing but despair 
and gloom. We must acknowledge that over against this 
Niebuhr places the possibilities and asserts that in every 
situation there are untried opportunities to apply the spirit 
of love. It is true, too, that he points out the creativity 
and nobility of man which is the other side of his !reedom. 
The problem is holding the good and evil in proper tension. 
One would like to hear him say a bit more about the imago 
~ in every man. Perhaps in his efforts to combat the 
extreme of liberalism with its stress on the goodness of 
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man, it is understandable that he would over-emphasize the 
evil in man. One wonders, too, if, since apparently there 
is some evil in all of man's acts in the light of the fact 
that his motives are never pure and the ideal of love is 
unattainable, there might not be some truth in the opposite. 
Is there genuine good in history as surely as there is evil? 
Niebuhr points out that the Cross of Christ is a reminder 
of the sin and evil in history, but is it not also the 
reminder of the good? 
With reference to the second problem, man's trans-
cendance, Niebuhr is right in recognizing this unique ability 
of man to step outside of himself, so to speak. The question 
is whether man, by doing so, participates in what appears to 
be another realm of being and whether he actually transcends 
his reason. Niebuhr points in one place to man's fear of 
death and to his anticipation of another dimension of 
reality as being proofs of man's tranacendance. But is this 
accomplished beyond reason? There is no doubt about the 
reality of the fear since it involves the unknown, but in what 
way is this an aspect of man's transcendance instead of his 
reason? It would seem that any image of death or life beyond 
might be nothing more than a composite of what man knows by 
reason in history. Niebuhr can easily be misunderstood at 
this point, but the question must be asked. 
The subject of myth is treated by both Bultmann and 
Niebuhr though the former dwells on it at much greater 
length, perhaps because of his interest as a New Testament 
scholar. The two men approach the subject with considerable 
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difference, but come out much closer than they went in. Both, 
however, are open to criticism. 
Attention will be given later to some of the specific 
instances of Bultmann's demythologizing, but perhaps now is 
an appropriate time to remark on some concerns about the 
whole process. Basically, Bultmann is correct in seeing the 
need to demythologize the New Testament where the first cen-
tury world-view tends to obscure the message. And he is 
right in understanding that the myths are not to be discarded 
but rather re-interpreted for modern man. But there are 
several aspects of the subject which Bultmann fails to prop-
erly acknowledge. 
We have already noted the inaccuracies of his analysis 
of modern thought and the problems of subjectivity. Their 
implications for the approach to demythologizing are obvious. 
But as for myth as an expression of the other-worldly and 
divine in terms of this-worldly and human, he does not seem 
to adequately recognize the inevitability of mytho-poetic 
language wherever one speaks of the activity of God. The 
language of religious and spiritual truth and experience, as 
contrasted with science,is that of myth and poetry, symbol 
and imagery. It shall always be so. Even such simple terms 
as "Father" or usontt are mythological when used in reference 
to God and man in relationship, but man has no choice but to 
so express himself. Bultmann does acknowledge this, but he 
does not seem to see that this is as true today as it was when 
the New Testament was written. In re-interpreting the kerygma 
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for modern man, the task is as much one of transmythologizing 
as it is demythologizing. 
A further recognition follows and that is that there 
may well be a twentieth century myth. In the world-view, we 
have seen that "cause and effect" might also be the language 
of myth. For that matter, so might "process." There is 
really little doubt that two thousand years from now, pos-
sible catastrophic events not accounted for, man will look 
back on us and think that our world-view is quite naive 
and unrealistic. 
We might also observe that there is mythological 
language even within the existentialist philosophy which 
Bultmann employs. Such phrases as "being-in-the-world," 
"divine transoendance," "primordial understanding;" and "leap 
of faith" reflect the need for interpretation. It cannot be 
simply assumed that this language communicates to modern 
man any better than, or if as well as, the present language 
of the New Testament. Indeed, one must have a:ta.irly ad-
vanced knowledge of the particular school of thought even 
to know what Bultmann is talking about. 
It might further be observed that somehow, down through 
the ages, many a simple peasant has been able to reach high 
levels of' Godly-living or even "authentic being" through a 
personal knowledge of Jesus Christ without ever feeling the 
need to remove the Biblical myths. This is not to make light 
of the need to demythologize, but simply to say that God's 
activity with men is not always dependent upon our scholarly 
pursuits. So much, for now, for Bultmann's demythologizing. 
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As early as 1920 Niebuhr made the observation that 
"Religion is poetry. The truth in the poetry is vivified by 
adequate poetic symbols and is therefore more convincing than 
the poor prose with which the average preacher must attempt 
to grasp the ineffable."3 Unlike Bultmann, Niebuhr fully 
realizes the necessity of expressing the religious truths in 
mytho-poetic language. Nor is he as anxious as Bultmann to 
extract the meaning from the myths and re-phrase it for con-
temporary ma.n by some process of transmytholog1z1ng. On the 
contrary, NiebUhr takes the mythological expressions seriously 
and sees the truth expressed within them. Myth provides the 
key to understanding history and the God-man relationship. 
As supra-historical and supra-rational, myth is the word of 
God to man "coming to him from beyond the boundaries of human 
knowledge; • • • Its form and content belong together, es-
sentially and inseparably."4 For Niebuhr, myth expresses a 
supra-historical and supra-rational truth about men, while 
for Bultmann, myth is always an expression, of subjective 
understanding of self. One is cosmological, the other anthro-
pological. 
The truth which the myth communicates about eternity 
and time is essential to it. Biblical literalists concretize 
the myth and liberals cast myth aside entirely; both miss the 
important truth which is there. This is an important and good 
York: 
3N1ebuhr, Leavesfrom • , ,, p. 32. 
4Ra.ns Hoff'man, The Theolosi of Reinhold Niebuhr (New 
Charles Scr1bner1s Sons, 19501", p. 77. 
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point of Niebuhr's and differs greatly from Bultmann's view 
that the truth of the myth comes to each man from "something 
. 
out there." Niebuhr may employ contemporary myth to commun-
icate truth, but by his understanding of Biblical mythology 
it is impossible for him to transmythologize. 
Niebuhr's main problem with myth deals with the rela-
tion of myth and symbol to historical events. One is never 
quite sure whether he is saying that there is an objective 
historical event behind the myth/symbol and whether such is 
necessary for the myth/symbol to be valid. Was there really 
a Tower of Babel or an Ark of the Covenant? He treats the 
Creation story as "primitive" myth and the Fall as non-his-
torical, but he also explain~ the Trinity and the Incarnation 
as myth/symbol. In one place he seems to be saying that as 
a pointer toward the trans-historical, myth inevitably 
falsifies history, while in another he seems to insist on the 
reality of the historical event. Some of the confusion may 
be based on his sometimes interchangeable, sometimes distinc-
tive usage, of the terms myth and symbol. 
In one respect, NiebUhr's treatment of myth is most 
satisfying. In his collection of sermons, Beyond Tragedy, 
he is particularly effective in discussing the essential 
truths which are contained in some of the Biblical myths and 
in considering the dialectical relation between the temporal 
and the eternal. On the other hand, Bultmann treats the 
relationship of myth to history more definitely and with 
greater consistency in his total approach to the subject. If 
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Niebuhr would clear up the ambiguity of myth and symbol, as 
well as their relationship to objective history, his treat-
ment would be more acceptable. 
As we come to a consideration of the ways in which 
these two men approach the subject of the Christian faith and 
history, there are comments which must be made regarding each 
before any comparative statement oan be made. 
The question of subjectivity arises again when we 
turn to Bultmann's treatment of the Christian faith. One 
may be tempted to conclude that the faith rests completely 
on one's personal experience and that, therefore, you may 
have yours and I may have mine and they may not be in the 
same tenets or the same god. The criteria must be its mean-
ing to me. Certainly, there can be no proof and decidedly 
no proof-texts. (Interestingly, Bultmann is a great employer 
of proQf-texts, particularly in his two-volume Theolosz 2£. 
the New ,testament.) Furthermore, one can never answer the 
question of why the Christian should claim that the Ohrist-
event was and is the decisive eschatological event. Why him 
and not someone else? Why not John the Baptist, or Buddha 
or any one of a number of "good" people? Bultmann tries to 
answer this in his "Reply to the Critics" when he says that 
'God encounters us in His Word - 1.e. in a particular word, 
in the proclamation inaugurated with Jesus Christ. True, God 
encounters us at all times in all places, but he cannot be 
seen everywhere unless His Word comes to us as well and 
makes the moment of revelation intelligible to ue in its own 
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light."5 He elaborates on this to equate Jesus Ohrist with 
the Word, but his insistence upon this being verifiable only 
as an esohatologioal event for the individual still leaves 
these questions open. At this point, another question must 
also be asked. If the Christ-event as present reality is 
dependent upon my response, is preaching of the kerygma the 
Word of God only as I recognize it as such? Further, would 
Christ have be.en Christ if no one had responded? It seems 
to be a matter of pro!!!!, vs. Rro §..!, but actually shouldn't 
it be seen to be both? 
Most of Bultmann's problems arise out of a failure to 
recognize the necessary relationship between historisch and 
gesoh1chtl1ch. He must either bring objective-history up to 
existential history or visa-versa. Even when agreeing with 
him that Ohristian theology and Christian preaching must be 
concerned with Jesus Christ as gesohiohtlioh, we must none-
theless insist that the historisch does have value and that, 
in fact, there would be no saving events without certain 
objeot1ve-h1storioal events, The Christ of faith cannot be 
separated as eas11y from the Jesus of history as Bultmann 
proposes. He subordinates the objective-historical events 
to the point of making the history of Jesus at least shadowy 
and almost dooetically sp1r1tua1. On quotable grounds, he 
would deny this vigorously. uThe agent of God's presence 
and activity, the mediation of God's reconciliation of the 
world unto himself, is a real figure of history. 116 He also 
6Bultmann et al, Kerygma and Myth ••• , pp. 206-7. 
6IbidL, P• 44. 
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confesses that it is the superb paradox that Jesus was both 
human and divine.7 But his overall emphasis on the existen-
tial-history denies this and he fails to see that a central 
aspect of that superb paradox is that Jesus Christ was ~­
torisch and geschichtlich. 
As a result of this outlook, Bultmann has little con-
.. 
oern for the life of Jesus nor for the Biblical accounts of 
that life. Even though he acknowledges that the word of 
God 1s not a "mysterious oracle, but a sober, factual account 
of a human life, of Jesus of Nazareth, possessing saving 
efficacy for man," he pays the account little attention and 
holds the objective-historical happenings as of little import.8 
Nils A. Dahl has criticized Bultmann squarely at this point: 
The existentialist interpretation carried out 
consistently signifies, • • • not only a de-
mythologizing but also a deh1storicizing of 
the New Testament. The deh1stor1.c1zing of the 
New Testament is an ultra-Pauline extreme con-
ditioned by existence philosophy which does 
not do justice to the Gospels. Though it may 
be true that the Gospels are proclamation and 
witness, still it would be completely contrary 
to the intention of the evangelists to declare 
as irrelevant the inquiry into the historicity 
of the narratives.9 
To be interested in the earthly life of its Lord and Saviour 
is a necessary characteristic of an historical religion: to 
desert such interest and divorce the Ohrist of faith from the 
Jesus of History would be a precarious rooting, indeed. 
7Bultmann, Theolosi-of ~~Testament, II, 123-127. 
8Bul tmann et al., Kerygma ~ M;yth • • • , p. 44. 
9oarl E. Braaten and Roy A. Harr1ev1lle (eds.) Kerygma 
~ H1stor;v:: ! S:ympo~ium .2!!. the Theolog~ Qi. Rudolf Bultmann 
\~ew York: Abingdon Press, 1962), p. 1 3. 
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The early Church was extraordinarily firm in its insis-
tence that the religion should be firmly grounded in history 
and, as though prov1dent1ally guided, would have no tampering 
with the flesh of Ohrist as though he were someone who did not 
endure real pain nor experience true humanity as they knew it. 
Both in the canonizing of the New Testament (as it is absurd 
to assume that the writers gave their pbantasy free reign) 
and in the formulae of the early creeds, they guarded against 
this error. Though it is true that the Gospel accounts of 
the earthly life of Jesus are written from within the posi-
tion of faith and in light of the Resurrection, they can 
hardly be dismissed as totally inaccurate and irrelevant. 
Bultmann's treatment of the Cross gives little atten-
tion to its significance as historisch, again bowing out in 
favor of gesc~!chtl1ch. To him, its significance is the 
fact that God speaks to me in the Oross-event and it becomes 
present reality for me as I make the Oross of Ohriat my own, 
undergoing crucifixion with him, becoming free from myself. 
As a redemptive event, it has cosmic importance only in 
these terms and cannot be viewed as a process wrought outside 
of me and of my world. To Bultmann, this does not mean that 
it is a mythical event, but an existential-historical 
(geschichtlioh) one which originated in an objeot1ve-h1stor1cal 
(historisoh) event. But it becomes redemptive only as I 
appropriate its significance for myself. Bultmann is right 
in asserting that the Oross of Ohr1st cannot be understood 
outside of faith, but the question is whether it is signi-
ficant that the Cross of Christ was also the Oross of Jesus 
1. 
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as a figure in past history. He admits that the early 
preachers looked at it this way, but then they had lived 
with him and it was an experience in their own lives. For us, 
as an event of the past, the Cross cannot disclose its own 
meaning. But, we must ask, did not the first preachers see 
the cross and come to understand its significance after the 
resurrection and in light of the resurrection, just as we 
do? And did not the cross in some way become significant 
because it was the oross of Jesus and not someone else? The 
cross must be seen as both historisch and gesohichtlich and 
as,.significant not only because it became the latter, but 
precisely because it was and is both. 
The .subordination of the objective-historical becomes 
particularly acute with reference to the resurrection. 
Wilder accuses him of seeing the resurrection as something 
which happened only between God and the disciples rather than 
between God and Jesus Christ: it must be seen as a real 
event, apart from the Cross, and it must be viewed as the 
mighty act of God in Ohrist.10 Bultmann's dismissal of the 
resurrection as a mythical event is an arbitrary decision on 
his pa.rt based on his pnor assumption·::that anything mirac-
ulous in character must be eliminated as being historisch. 
Such an assumption sounds far more like the influence of 
liberal modernism that existentialism. The miracle of the 
Resurrection was an event in past history witnessed to by a 
select f'ew and by the Gospel wr1 ters. He who was resurrec.ted 
10Amos Wilder, "Mythology in the New Testament," 
Journal .Q!. Biblical Literature, Vol. 69, p. 121. . 
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was the same Jesus Christ who was crucified. His appropriate 
body was both within time and space and beyond time and space 
and they both knew him and did not know him. These witnesses 
cannot be dismissed as foolish visionaries and the faith of 
the early Church, which the writers recorded with integrity 
cannot be counted as naive. Every geschichtlich event must 
be based on an historisch fact. Bultmann's statement that 
the resurrection rests on the objective-historical event of 
the cross and is a witness to the fact that this was the 
Cross of Christ seems to be escapism and a bit absurd. The 
resurrection must be seen as an objective-historical event 
in its own right. It is interesting to observe that the 
kerygma for Bultmann does declare that it is this One and 
this One only who is preached. That is the basic offense. 
Does it really become any greater with the acceptance of the 
Resurrection? 
It is this basic failure to unite the Jesus of Nazareth 
with the Christ of faith that brings BUltmann most of his 
troubles. His concept of the development of Ohristology 
within the early Church contributes substantially to this 
failure, but it primarily rests on his emphasis on the un-
importance of historisch for faith. Amos N. Wilder, in his 
review of Kerygma ~Myth, commented: 
What is peculiar and surprising is that Bultmann 
puts historical research out of count in what 
concerns our grasp of the real significance of 
these matters. Only faith is operative here -
on the basis of direct revelation of the Word. 
He thinks, indeed, of revelation as operating 
in isolation from historical contingencies 
and relativities - save that, of course, it 
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began with an historical event and that our 
own faith is conditioned by our individual 
historical setting. The Word reaches us. as 
it were, by a kind of high-tension trolley 
across the centuries and strikes its saving 
spark in us. But the origin of its must not 
be placed at the mercy of historical investi-
gation .11 
Closely akin to the matter of relating h1stor1sch to 
seschichtlich is that of relating eschatology to the life of 
man-in-the-world. Even if one accepts the view that history 
must be essentially seen as existing in the present, the 
fact remains that any given moment ~ be historical, but 
only ma~ be eschatological. In the eschatological moment 
in which time, past and future, is telescoped into "now" 
and man achieves authentic existence, man is nonetheless in-
volved in the world of objective facts. In the best of 
existentialist terms, he is still enmeshed in the toils of 
decisions and problems and though open to possibilities (as 
Heidegger puts it), still limited by his earthly existence 
and unreleased from the course of objective happenings& 
Bultmann's emphasis on the eschatological seems to 
give little value to life as it is lived in time and space. 
Butterfield has wisely observed that 
It has always been realised in the main tradition 
of Christianity that if the Word was made flesh 
matter can never be regarded as evil in itself. 
In a similar way, if 011e moment of time could 
hold so much as this, then you cannot brush time 2 away and say that any moment of it is mere vanity.I 
11 6 illQ.~. p. 12 • 
12Herbert Butterfield, Christianity and History {New 
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1950), p. 121. 
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In all fairness to Bultmann, he does say that in the eschatol-
ogical moment when man becomes authentic being, he becomes 
free to obey. 
The Pauline catalogue of the fruits of the Spirit 
('love, joy, peace, long-suffering, kindness, 
goodness, faithfulness, temperance', Gal. 5:22) 
shows how faith, by detaching man from the world, 
makes him capable of fellowship in the community. 
Now that he is delivered from anxiety and from 
the frustration which comes from clinging to 
the tangible realities of the visible world, 
man 1s free to enjoy fellowship with others •• 
• • And this means being a new creature.13 
The ambiguity arises in his view of esohatolog1oal existence 
as being complete detachment from the world, by which he 
claims to mean, not asceticism, but dealing with the world 
in a spirit of 11as if not. 11 From an existentialist anthro-
pology, this presents real problems and man's relationship 
with the world becomes quite vague. If we coUld find evi-
dence in his writing to avow a definite belief in an escha-
tological existence beyond death, this question of man's 
relationship to the world would be less of a problem perhaps. 
But he has little to say specifically about this. He does, 
however, deny the actuality of the Resurrection except in 
the proclaimed Word and he does apparently equate "lostness" 
. . 
with inauthentic existence and "saved" with authentic existence 
in the here and now. If he is to hold to a concept of realized 
eschatology, then he must deal more seriously with man's 
relationship with the world. On the other hand, if he holds 
to his existentialist anthropology and his understanding of 
13Bultmann et al, Kerygma ~ ~ ••• , p. 22. 
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redemption and faith, I'm not sure that the problem can be 
overcome. What this does to the historical deposit of the 
Church down through the years and to the witness of this or 
that Christian as he lived yesterday is another question. 
Apparently, however, it makes it rather unimportant. 
In considering Niebuhr's treatment of Christianity and 
history, the first question that comes to mind centers in the 
ambiguity of his Ohristology. In some of his earlier writings 
he makes frequent references to the "religion of Jesus" and · 
to the "ethics of Jesus" and in his first book went so far 
as to state 
If there is any lack of identity between the Jesus 
of history and the Christ of religious experience, 
the Jesus of history is nevertheless more capable 
of giving historical reality to the necessa~y 
Obrist idea than any character of history.14 
In later writings he seems to have changed in this respect, 
but his thought concerning the nature of the person of 
Jesus Christ is still quite ambiguous. On several occasions 
he treats the orthodox statement that Jesus was both divine 
and human as a mythological one. He does not, however, with 
his emphasis on the Christ of faith, fall into the error to 
which Bultmann succumbs, that of making the historical Jesus 
vague and unimportant. 
E. J. Oarnell has been extremely critical of Niebuhr 
in his treatment of the Jesus of history and accuses Niebuhr 
of making Christ the abstract wisdom of history and Jesus of 
14n.e1nhold Niebuhr, Does Civilization Need Religion? 
p. 235, cited by Paul Lehmami;-11 The Ohristology of Reinhold: 
Niebuhr," Reinhold Niebuhr: !!1Jl.Religious ••• , ed. by 
Kegley and Bretall, p. 260. 
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history as inconsequentially related to his system. He goes 
even fUrther in his criticism by saying that, since Niebuhr 
states that where there is history1here is freedom and where 
there is freedom there is sin, Jesus was finite and a sinner 
and is judged himself by the 0~1st. 15 This is going a little 
far, it seems, as Niebuhr is conscientious, even if vague, 
about attempting to hold the fUll human reality of Jesus to 
the person and work of Christ. The criticism, however, seems 
just in light of Niebuhr's claim that sin is inevitable but 
not necessary. Actually, Niebuhr has not treated the sub-
ject of Ohristology explicitly. It would be well if he 
would spell out his thoughts a little more precisely. 
We might, at this point, say a word about Niebuhr's 
treatment of the resurrection of Christ. While it is much 
more satisfactory than Bultmann's complete dismissal of the 
resurrection as non-historical and his insistence that 1t be 
seen only as existing within the preaching of the Word, 
Niebuhr's conclusions leave something to be desired. We 
greatly appreciate his emphasis on the revelatory depth of 
the fact of the resurrection, but cannot agree that the 
Biblical accounts are mere "efforts to certify this triumph 
. 
through specific historical details fjihicif may well be re-
garded as an expression of a scepticism which runs through 
the whole history of Christianity~nl6 The miracle of the 
15Edward John Carnell, ~ Theology Q.! Reinhold Niebuhr 
(Grand Rapids, Michigan: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 
1960), rev. ed., p. 144. 
16N1ebuhr, Faith ~ Histor1, p. 148. 
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resurrection is imbedded in the historical process and must 
be seen as something more than an awareness on the part of 
the disciples. His proposition that the recognition of the 
triumph of God's sovereignty was the miracle of belief is 
very much appreciated, but that cannot be all. There must 
be an historical event behind that fact. 
Fortunately, Niebuhr does not deal with historisch 
and geschichtlich, but he does have some problems in relating 
what he calls ubeyond history0 to the historical process. 
("Beyond history" appears to mean something beyond time and 
space and all the phenomena of1hi.s world, yet it also is 
the source of meaning for history. D. D. Williams rather 
humorously calls for the 11meaning of .me~1ng 11 at this point.17) 
It must be recognized; and appreciated, that Niebuhr goes to 
great lengths to keep man within the historical process and 
related to it. But he runs into trouble when he stresses 
that meaning must come from beyond history. Nature, history, 
and beyond history seem rather unrelated a great deal of the 
time. 
This becomes particularly acute when man is seen in 
relation to God. Niebuhr is ambiguous in his discussion of 
the relation of God's redemptive work to history. In Faith 
i':n.9:, History, he makes the statement that "from the first 
. 
covenant of God to the resurrection, God's revelations to a 
people are 1mbedded in history" and later he states that "the 
climax of the crucifixion and resurrection thus become not 
l7naniel D. Williams, ttNiebUhr and Liberalism," Rein-
hold Niebuh~: !!_is Religious •.•• , ed. by Kegley and Era:tell, 
pp. 207-8. 
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merely the culmination of the whole series of revelations 
but the pattern of all subsequent confrontations between God 
and man."18 At this point there are four questions which we 
would like to ask Niebuhr. (1) If the Christian revelation 
occurred in history, it seems to follow that it must be con-
nected with preceding and subsequent history and that it 
must function as a power within history. If there is hope 
beyond this realm of history, then must not there also be 
hope within this realm? (2) If the God-man relationship is 
seen to be one of I-Thou, does this occur in complete trans-
cendance or does it not occur within this realm of history? 
(3) In Christ, something happened in history and the new 
age began. In man's response of faith and repentance, some-
thing happens:m history and while in one sense he does live 
in the interim before the fUlfillment of history, is it not 
also true that in another sense he participates in that ful-
fillment now? (4) In redemption all of the evil and injustice 
of life are surely not removed, but if it is relevant for man, 
as Niebuhr would surely insist, then should it not be said 
that God's redemptive work occurs within history and not 
beyond it? 
We are not suggesting that Niebuhr errs by an emphasis 
on the beyond that negates this realm. On the contrary, his 
emphasis is always on man in the historical process. But he 
does insist that the meaning of this process is only available 
18 
Niebuhr, Faith~ History, pp. 148-49. 
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beyond the process. What we are asking is that he make more 
clear his understanding of the relationship of the two. 
A part of this same issue, obviously, is the question 
concerning the source of ethical norms which are to be applied 
to history. Niebuhr attempts to emancipate himself from 
pure relativism by clinging to the Christian perspective, but 
his revolt against legalism and absolutisms fails to see this 
through with much success. At some points he seems to say 
that there exists a moral law which is God's commandment, 
while at others he seems to imply that no moral law can be 
known or made applicable within history. One cannot but 
appreciate his emphasis on the law of love as the impossible 
possibility, yet one wonders if this does not agree with 
some kind of universal ethic which, though coming from beyond 
history, imposes its meaning upon history, judging it as well 
as bringing it to redemption. We are back to the question 
of this relationship between history and beyond history. 
Robert E. Fitch has been quite critical of Niebuhr at this 
point and observes that 
the principles of nature and the principles of 
history are not so radically divorced as Niebuhr 
insists. Such a law L.i'hat is, one wbioh would 
see these two as inter-relate£9' would allow for 
flexibility as well as for precision, would 
combine the positive element of love with the 
negative element of judgment, would readily 
embrace the multifarious polarities and ironies 
of life, and behind the competing but still 
cooperating impulses toward the creative and 
the discreative in man, would yet point to the 
Christian revelation !.!!. history as the token 
of a God who, under the conditions of human 
/ 
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freedom and finitude, is still both absolutely 
and empirically the Lord of that history.19 
For Niebuhr, what is the source of the ethical norms, if there 
are any, and what is the relation of nature, history, and 
beyond history? Always stressing the world of nature and of 
human history, he escapes any kind of "other-worldly" solu-
tions that might suggest gold streets and pearly gates, yet 
he remains extremely vague at this point of meaning, prin-
ciples, and norms. 
In this final section of this thesis, we have attempted 
to evaluate the strengths and the weaknesses of the concept of 
history in the thought of these two men and to point out where 
they are similar and where they are different. We have not 
attempted to say where one is right and the other wrong, nor 
to set our own thought up as the ultimate truth. 
Appreciation must be expressed to both Bultmann and 
Niebuhr for their worthy attempts to speak to the contemporary 
situation and to make the Ohristian Gospel intelligible to 
modern man. Some of their errors may be best understood 
when placed over against the thoughts of such various antag-
onists as liberalism, orthodoxy, and progressivism. In reply 
to these, one man goes off in one direction while the other 
seems to go off in another. 
Bultmann finds meaning within the existentialist 
philosophy and this provides the basis for his ideas of history. 
Within this framework and with these presuppositions, he builds 
19Fitch, it 306 8 
.Q.ll• £..._. ' pp. - • 
(. 
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his ''system, 0 if he will please forgive the term, and develops 
his emphasis on the eschatological dimension of history and 
his emphasis upon the individual and his encounter with God. 
Because he begins from an existentialist anthropology, his 
thought forms are quite different from Niebuhr's and any 
particular conclusions, therefore, extremely difficult to 
actually compare. 
It must be said that Niebuhr does a better job of 
criticizing other theories than he does of constructing a 
satisfactory alternative. Yet because he has rightly sensed, 
as Hoffman points out, that "contemporary society can conceive 
of no goal which would give it direction and meaning, that 
history seems to have lost all significance, 11 20 he has at-
tempted to give insights that would help people see a sense 
of meaningfulness in the whole of history, not just in the 
present as Bultmann does, and see the movement toward the 
end as filled with purpose. 
As he develops his concept of history, however, he 
keeps in balance the mutually serving roles of society and 
the individual, in contrast to Bultmann's rather strict 
individualism, and he places his primary emphasis on human 
history as it is lived in this world. Actually, it would be 
helpful if Bultmann had a little more of Niebuhr's emphasis 
on this world and if Niebuhr had a little more of Bultmann's 
eschatology. Bultmann would do well to try to rectify his 
thought to give history the meaning and significance which 
20 Hoffman, .Q:Q.• £.ll., p. 84. 
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it warrants and has. If one must decide, it would be our con-
clusion that one would be better off to err with Niebuhr who, 
at least, does not negate human history. Both, however, need 
a little of the other. 
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